In this paper I assume that in humans the creation of knowledge depends on a discrete time, or stage, sequential decision-making process subjected to a stochastic, information transmitting environment. For each time-stage, this environment randomly transmits Shannon type information-packets to the decisionmaker, who examines each of them for relevancy and then determines his optimal choices. Using this set of relevant information-packets, the decision-maker adapts, over time, to the stochastic nature of his environment, and optimizes the subjective expected rate-of-growth of knowledge. The decision-maker's optimal actions, lead to a decision function that involves, over time, his view of the subjective entropy of the environmental process and other important parameters at each time-stage of the process. Using this model of human behavior, one could create psychometric experiments using computer simulation and real decision-makers, to play programmed games to measure the resulting human performance.
personal uncertainty), in contradistinction to the chaotic world of non intelligent dynamic systems where the net entropy is believed to be always increasing. In the Brownian motion of micro-particles in suspension, for example, it appears that these non-intelligent systems lack a means for organizing against, or adapting to the hidden mechanisms of their environment. For the most part, except for some chemical processes that tend oscillate back and forth over time from chaos to order, with obvious consequences to the effect on their entropy, these non-intelligent processes, in the end, always increase their local entropy. Ilya Prigogine (1996) has given many examples of this kind of pseudo lifelike behavior.
In this paper, I postulate that lifelike systems have several necessary unique facilities that affect their decrease in relative entropy through the experience of timeevents during their organized knowledge creating activity. The first of these is the basic ability to make a sequence of optimal decisions over time. This ability, in the face of a very complex world, enables living beings to adapt and control their decision-making through the acceptance or rejection of random information-packets that are transmitted from their environment during each time-event. Within these systems, we find the human knowledge creation activity, over time, enables the optimal acceptance or rejection of random information-packets, received by their senses from their immediate stochastic environment and then stored in their mind. As Shakespeare aptly put it for poets (and mathematicians),
"And as imagination bodies forth The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name." The Direction of Time has shown that memory (of some kind) is an essential element forcing time to always seem to flow in an irreversibly increasing direction. This human memory, the second necessary element, enables the human decision-maker, to reduce his relative entropy and optimize his decisions over time. The mathematical model, described herein, considers how these key dependences, decision-making and memory, enable the human knowledge creating process and produce a decrease in the decision-maker's relative entropy.
It takes nerve for an economist and computer scientist to leap into a world dominated by cognitive scientists and philosophers, and worse yet, propose yet another mathematical model for man's capability to accumulate knowledge. My previous research in mathematical statistics, information theory and economic decision processes forced me to pass down this dangerous path. It began when Claude Shannon (1948) introduced a rational measure for information based on the needs of the communication engineers at Bell Telephone Labs and thus launched the formal substructure for "Information Theory." In his original concept, Shannon considered that all informationpackets had equal value. Since his primary focus was on the efficiency of the transmission of electronic information over a bandwidth limited communications channel, he was not directly concerned with the value of that information. In Shannon's original view the value of a transmitted information-packet was always in the eyes of the sender or receiver, not the communications service provider. Leon Brillouin (1963) pointed out that the value of Shannon's measure of information is dependent on the potential use of that information by a decision-maker over time. Shannon and his associates soon rectified that omission in their later papers. J. Marshack (1960) advanced the classical theory of economics by considering the role of information as a new "factor" in the production function. His work was soon followed by several other similar papers.
Recently, Kenneth Arrow (1996) extended Shannon's cost of information theory by showing how information theory, applied to modern economic theory, causes the generation of strong increasing economic returns to scale, over time, in production that dominates today's new economic growth in an "information" age. Finally for nonmathematical philosophers, Fred Dretske (1999) has recently distilled, in great detail, all of these knowledge and information fragments. These new economic and philosophic applications of information theory provide a jumping off point for this paper.
In the early 1900's, Henri Poincaré gave a lecture before the Societe de Hadamand's concept of "Incubation," or as I call it, the "Sleep on it" time phase, is a familiar experience for most scientists as they "invent" new concepts. The "Aha" phase always seems to appear later, almost any time after the "Incubation" time-phase or as I call it the "Sleep on it" time phase. I will postulate that each time-stage in my knowledge creation process passes through each of these three time phases. Poincaré goes further and borrows Epicurus's interesting "idea hooks" argument and gathers a call for wide diversity in research. Let's take a look at a very simple discrete deterministic compounded sequential knowledge creating process, over time, for the compounded rate-of-growth of knowledge, K T , given a constant increment of a decision-maker's relevant information given during each time-stage of the process. We form the following deterministic discrete sequential process
By repeated substitution, this leads to a more familiar, concise, result
taking the natural logarithm of this we get Remembering that the i y 's are components of an independently chosen random vector and since that forces to also be a random vector, it is customary to view this process analytically by considering the statistical expectation of this random process. So, we have for one typical time-stage of the decision-maker's knowledge process currently at
Now it is also realistic to assume that the probability distribution for the environment's random value vector, the information generator, is to be chosen from a multinomial beta distribution. Therefore, in this special case, the statistical expectation of is given by
where we also insist on the usual probability space conditions, 
and we also assume that this random process is quasi-ergodic -that is the probabilities, the i p 's, will remain constant during the time duration of the process.
So in this case, it can be shown that the rate-of-growth for our time-sequential knowledge creation process at time-stage t is given by ( )
where the " 1 t " signifies that this is for just one stage of a process after already experiencing t time-stages.
The information-relevance vector can be subjected to the additional special conditions M , 1 0 and r 1
and each of the environment's information-packages is assigned to a probability
At this point equation (7) and the constraints of (6) and (8) optimal values for the decision-maker's, the *'s, at stage t is, for example, a non-linear mathematical optimization procedure. The simple "marginal value" procedure for optimizing equation (7), one that is based only on the determination of the first and second derivatives of equation (7), will not assure that the special constraints on the However, in reducing the components of the set of i's we have altered the probability space upon which the i p 's were originally defined. In other words, it is possible that . Therefore, we must renormalize the original probability space to that represented only by the set of 
By using the references, and using the Kuhn-Tucker the non-linear optimization method, we can find the *'s that optimize (10) is given by
where M M + ∈ is the sub-set of the decision-maker's relevant information-packets.
The Decision-Maker Adapts to his Environment
The decision-maker's "Sleep on it" phase needs further consideration. There is a serious human problem with equations (9), (10) 
We will assume for simplicity that the decision-maker will start in total ignorance of these initial probabilities. Note that after a few time-stages of the process and if observations for the information-packets have occurred, the 's are very likely to deviate from this equal likely condition. On the first few time-stages of this adaptive, stochastic knowledge creating process, when the decision-maker still has only a few values for the 's, the decision-maker may exhibit wild instability (partial ignorance) in his estimates for the 's. Fortunately, since the Bayes estimator is known to be both statistically consistent and sufficient, the estimator is one that will "settle down" over We can now write the adaptive version of equations (10) and (11) that reflect the decision-maker's use of subjective probabilities to generate the optimal adaptive relevance factors, the 's, by using the decision-maker's now known subjective probabilities. We have
1ˆ* max ln max ln 1 
Remember that
By substitution of (16) into (15) we can determine the optimal rate-of-growth of knowledge for this single t th stage. This substitution will bring up several important relationships with respect to the entropy of the environmental process, but first we must consider the whole time-event sequential process in detail. With the completion of the equations (15) (16) and (17) above we have come to the end of the "Sleep on it" phase for one stage, the t th , of a discrete, sequential, adaptive, stochastic knowledge-gathering process, we now are ready to turn to the "Aha" phase, where we finalize the whole sequence of T stages, where . 1, 2, , t T = …
The "Aha!" Phase Begins
We have seen above that the adaptive estimates of the subjective probabilities require some kind of history of the decision-maker's observations, so we must extend the concept developed above to an entire event-time sequence, where for each stage, t, the decision-maker's relevant sequential event history can be generated. For example: We know that kicking on big stones is hard on your foot. Do we really know this or are we just convinced that we know this? Some decision-makers, who have inborn common sense would accept this opinion. They are already convinced that kicking a stone must hurt your foot, so conviction plays a sort of initial condition in the knowledge-gathering process. For the rest of us, how many times must we kick a big stone before we are convinced that it hurts? Do you need to remember every time you kicked a big stone? Probably not, you too will have accumulated all the knowledge you need to be convinced about big stones. The existence of your conviction is the analog of the Bayesian statistical estimator in our mathematical process for knowledge-gathering. If you, as a decision-maker perceive in the current time-stage the presence of a stone in your path, chances are you decision would be to step past it and go on to your next timestage. Did you review in your mind all the past events when you tripped on stones in your past time-stages? Chances are you didn't, because you possessed the conviction that big stones in your path should be avoided and that single conviction actually occupied a relatively small number of the available information bits stored in your brain. Conviction becomes the economizer of our brain information bits, and plays the role of the sufficient statistic in our mathematical model. Without conviction, our memory would soon run out of sufficient bits to enable us to make rational decisions.
With the use of the details we have developed about sequential dynamic processes we can now see how the decision-maker can maximize an entire time-sequential knowledge creating process consisting of T stages. This extension is not just a simple substitution of T and T-1 for the single stage t and t-1 equations. Fortunately, maximizing the first stage of the time sequential process is relatively easy, since the decision-maker has, by definition, no previous time history on which to base estimates of the subjective probabilities (and therefore he relies on his Carnap guess for the initial subjective probabilities) and only his initial conditions, his initial state of knowledge, . As we saw in equations (15) and (16) 1* max ln ln ln ln
The " * " here indicates that the ( ) 0 * g K is its "optimal" value.
Because of the additive property of statistical expectations we can rewrite (18) 
Because each of the above terms is based on the immediately previous value of the rate-of-growth of knowledge and the previous values of the subjective probabilities for the information-packets, except the first term that is based on the initial condition and the initial guess of the subjective probabilities (that the decision-maker already 
Following Bellman's approach to the solution of dynamic processes, equation (22) encloses the entire sequence of terms with in the brackets of equation (19) to one functional equation. Returning to the objective of the paper, the maximum compounded rate-of-return for knowledge creation, we form the final result
This terse functional is best analyzed using computer simulation.
Implications of the Results
Referring back to equations (15) and (16), it is appropriate to actually substitute the decision maker's optimal relevance vector from (16) Many simplifying technical assumptions must be made to make this hypothesis amenable to mathematical analysis. Some of these assumptions are:
1. The process can be decomposed into a sequence of discrete causal timestages, each of which receives the a posteriori state from the previous stage.
During each time-stage a decision-maker takes an action that generates the a priori state for the following time-stage.
2. During this transformation the decision-maker optimizes his statistical expected compounded rate-of-growth of knowledge at each time-stage of the process. This assumption is based on the simple concept, "The more you know today; the more you are capable of knowing tomorrow."
3. The environment for this process is characterized by a hidden underlying stochastic mechanism that produces a discrete sequence of mutually independent events, the information-packets transmitted to the decision-maker and generated by a given quasi-stationary statistical process of the multinomial beta type.
4. The events produced by the environment at each stage of the discrete sequential process for each type of information-packet are the transmission of Shannon information-packets that are made available to the senses of the decision-maker. At each stage of this process, the environmental stochastic process exclusively controls the type of this information-packet transmitted and the actual probability of this transmission is unknown to the decisionmaker.
5. The decision-maker can only observe the stochastic events produced at each time-event by the environment, but not the underling probability generating parameters. This observation of events is augmented by the decision-maker's time dependent memory and that is used to construct a Bayes estimate at each stage for the subjective probability for each relevant event, given the arbitrary a priori distribution function of the multinomial beta type. The Bayes estimator, is statistically sufficient and consistent, and is used by the decisionmaker to compute a relevance-vector for the information-packet types, at each time-stage in the process.
6. The decision-maker, during a time-stage of the process, is capable of determining a set of optimal, relevant information-packets that maximizes the subjective value of his compounded rate-of-growth of knowledge.
7. In the process of knowledge creation, the statistical expectation of the stochastic vectors in the process must be "Markovian," that is, the current statistical expectation can be estimated solely by the single immediately proceeding probability estimate and the environmental events that occur at the current time-stage. This means that the immediately proceeding statistical expectation is defined as the decision-maker's current conviction and must, in itself, contain a summation of all the estimation history of all the previous statistical expectations over the relevant time of the process. This assumption makes the decision-making process an adaptive process that can be optimized stage-by-stage, recursively.
8. Because Bayesian probability estimators are consistent, the subjective compounded rate-of-growth of knowledge approaches the theoretical rate-ofgrowth, in probability, as the number of time-stages in the process approaches time infinity. Thus an intelligent decision-maker gets more intelligent as the number of observed time-events increase, and the decision-maker's relative entropy, as defined in (27) above decreases as he adapts to his environment over the course of the time sequential process.
None of these assumptions are, for the most part, restrictive for a real knowledge creating process; but, as a final warning to all scientists, we quote the advice from the Buddha, 
Suggestions for Further Research
Testing the hypothesis presented in this paper is required to justify the assumptions made herein. The art of psychometric testing has entered a new technological phase. With modern personal computer technology and specialized computer game development software the psychometric researcher can create realistic decision-making situations with complex, but controlled, environments. Built-in, behind the scenes, random event generators, with probability driving functions known only to the experimenter, can easily be programmed. For example, presenting students with realistic decision-making computer games, coupled with behind the scenes data collection software can accumulation their reaction times and performance measures. Properly designed by careful experimenters, these techniques may verify hypotheses for human behavior, such as presented in this paper.
Finally, from the neuropsychological point of view, reverse memory searching, as the decision-maker relies on his memory to adapt and form estimates of subjective probabilities is in agreement with recent psychometric experiments with rats conducted by Davis J. Foster and Matthew A Wilson (2006) at MIT. These researchers were able to actually observe the "replay" of the rat's experienced memories by measuring the activity of the neurons in the rat's hippocampus region of the brain where current memory events are formed. Dr. Wilson seems to believe that the hippocampus region replays, in reverse, the rat's previous memorized events, then another part of the rat's brain, perhaps the prefrontal cortex, provides reward signals that enable a decision-function to determine which memory events are to be retained and which are to be discarded to generate an advantageous memory for the rat.
